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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Torts: A Limitation of the "Family Car Doctrine" in Colorado?
The essential facts presented by the record in Vick v. Zumwalt,
M. M. Vick of Loveland, Colorado was, on February 16, 1952,
the owner of a Mercury automobile. On that date, while his par-
ents were out of town, 15-year-old David Vick took said automobile
from its garage and drove into the country with plaintiffs as his
guests and passengers. While so driving, David Vick played
"ditch em" with the driver of another car, and the Mercury he
was driving left the road and overturned. In this accident plain-
tiffs were injured, and as a result of these injuries this action was
instituted against the defendants M. M. Vick and David Vick.
Plaintiffs sought recovery against M. M. Vick under the "Family
Car Doctrine".
To show circumstances within the "Family Car Doctrine" the
complaint alleged "that the said motor vehicle driven by David
Vick was owned by his father, that said motor vehicle had been
purchased for family use; that the said motor vehic]e at the time
of the said negligence was being operated by David Vick solely for
his own pleasure under the general permission of the defendant
M. M. Vick; and that David Vick was a member of the household
of the defendant M. M. Vick at the time of said negligence."
The case was submitted to the jury for determination of the
issues, and for answers to certain special interrogatories submitted
by the court. We need concern ourselves with but one of the inter-
rogatories which was as follows:
"4. Was David Vick driving the automobile at the time
of the accident with the consent of the defendant M. M.
Vick?"
Together with interrogatory number four the court instructed
the jury as follows:
* * * If you find from a preponderance of the evidence
that David Vick, on the occasion in question, was using the
automobile with the consent, either express or implied, of
his father M. M. Vick, then you shall find for such plaintiffs
'Vick v. Zumwalt, __ Colo ..... C.B A. Ady. Sh. Vol. 6, P. 470; 273 P. 2d 1010.
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and against the defendants David Vick and M. M. Vick
jointly. Implied consent, as used in this instruction, is a
consent arising from facts and circumstances which would
lead a reasonable person to believe that consent had been
given.
The jury was further instructed that "consent" as used in the
instruction above quoted could be a general consent to the use of
the automobile at any or all times or "a special consent to the use
of the automobile on this particular occasion."
In answer to interrogatory number four, the jury found David
Vick had the "implied consent" of his father to the "general" or"special" use of the automobile.
The Supreme Court held in reviewing the judgment of the
trial court that the instructions relating to "consent" were faulty
and constituted reversible error. In so finding the Supreme Court
said,
If the parent over a period of time permitted and
allowed his son to use his automobile and made no com-
plaint, that might constitute implied permission for him to
use it, whether or not there was any express permission for
its use on the particular occasion under examination....
To establish the elements required to bring into operation
the family car doctrine, resort must be had to the circum-
stances, frequency and notoriety of operation of the auto-
mobile by a member, or members, of the owner's family.
* * * there must be consent, either express or implied, on
the part of the parent to the general use of the car, or an
express consent to the use of the car on the particular
occasion.
The court laid emphasis on the necessity of "customary or con-
tinued" use of the automobile by the child, to lead to a finding of
"implied" consent. Further, in quoting from an undisclosed source,
the court said, "Implied authority is actual authority circumstan-
tially proved, or evidenced by conduct, * * * it is authority which
the principal intended that the agent should have."
It is clear from the language of the Supreme Court that the
circumstances of each case must show a "customary or continued
use" of the automobile by the minor child, and such "customary
or continued use" known of and intended by the head of the house-
hold sought to be charged. These are the ingredients necessary
to a formulation of "implied" consent to "general" use of the
vehicle by the child. In the absence of a showing of "implied"
consent the plaintiff would have to prove "express" consent to use
on a particular occasion. The instruction given relating to implied
consent did not contain the necessary ingredients. It did not include
the necessary element of intent or knowledge on the part of the
parents to the use of the vehicle by the child. Although the evidence
indicated David Vick had at times used the car, it was not shown
the parents knew of this use. The state of the evidence then de-
manded the inclusion of the necessary element of knowledge by
the parent in the instruction. The omission was held to be error.
The court said "Implied consent cannot be shown by some conjec-
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tural situation or conclusion of the jurors or assumptions indulged
by them. It can only be shown by competent evidence, direct or
circumstantial".
Our attention should be focused on the Court's holding con-
cerning the "Family Car Doctrine". To determine the effect of
this holding upon the state of the law concerning the "Family Car
Doctrine" in this jurisdiction, prior decisions of the court should
be reviewed.
The "Family Car Doctrine" saw its beginning in Colorado in
the case of Hutchins v. Haffner, 63 Colo. 365, 167 P. 966. In that
case a husband, who owned an automobile conceded to be kept for
family purposes, was held liable for damages caused by the negli-
gent operation of the car by his wife. Liability was thus imposed
even though the husband was not present at the time of the acci-
dent nor in any way participated in the negligence. The court said,
A majority of this court have chosen to adopt the
doctrine that a husband is liable for an injury inflicted
by his automobile, which he purchased for family use,
while it was being operated by his wife, solely for her own
pleasure under his general permission to use the machine
whenever and wherever she pleased * * *
The court laid the theory of the husband's liability upon an
agency fiction, considered the husband-owner as Principal and the
family member-driver as agent, thus making use of the doctrine of
Respondiat Superior. The family member, in such circumstances,
is to be considered as furthering the interests of the principal by
using the auto for the purpose for which it was maintained, namely
family business or pleasure.
The doctrine as adopted in Hutchins v. Haffner, supra, was
extended considerably however in the case of Boyd v. Close et al.,
82 Colo. 150, 257 P. 1079. In that case action was brought against
the mother of one Dennis Phillips, 19 years old, and a passenger
in the car which struck plaintiff, for damages occasioned by the
automobile collision. The automobile involved, was part of the
estate of Mrs. Phillips' late husband, Dennis's father, and Mrs.
Phillips was in possession of the automobile as executrix of the
decedent's will. The evidence in the case indicated that at the time
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of the accident Dennis was not driving, but had relinquished con-
trol of the car to his friend Close who was with him on the oc-
casion. Both boys had been to a dance and were returning home
at the time of the accident. The evidence also indicated that Close
was driving while intoxicated. The Supreme Court reversed judg-
ment of the trial court based on a directed verdict and remanded
the case for a new trial allowing plaintiff to go to the jury on the
matter of negligence. In doing this the court held that Mrs. Phillips
could be held liable for the negligence of Dennis either in allowing
Close to drive or negligence of Close imputed to Dennis because
of a "joint enterprise". The court arrived at this conclusion by ap-
plying the "Family Car Doctrine", as declared in Hutchins v. Haf-
fner, supra. Mr. Chief Justice Burke on delivering the opinion of
the court said, "Liability under that doctrine is not confined to
owner or driver. It depends upon control and use". He went on fur-
ther to find that Mrs. Phillips had control and that the car was
kept for family use, therefore her liability was established. The
court continued saying "that Mrs. Phillips did not know of or ex-
pressly sanction the particular trip is also immaterial. It was clearly
within the purview of the general purpose for which the car was
kept and used, and her liability is thereby fixed".
It is interesting at this point to note that the court laid particu-
lar emphasis on the factors of "control and use" of the automobile
and well nigh eliminated any necessity of finding knowledge of or
consent to the particular use by the child.
Seven years later in the case of Boltz v. Bonner, 95 Colo. 350,
35 P 2d 1015, the "Family Car Doctrine" was again applied. In
that case Mrs. Boltz was held liable as owner of an automobile
involved in a collision as a result of the negligence of her daughter
who was driving at the time. Here again the court found that the
automobile was kept for the use and pleasure of the family and
was within the definition of a "Family Car" as laid down in
Hutchins v. Haffner, supra, and Boyd v. Close, supra. The Supreme
Court held that the trial court was correct in treating the automo-
bile as a "family car" as a matter of law when the owner of the
car testified that the car was at the disposal of the child whenever
such use did not interfere with the requirements of the owner.
The last interpretation by the Colorado Supreme Court of the
"Family Car Doctrine", immediately preceding the case of Vick v.
Zumwalt, is found in the case of Greenwood et al. v. Cecil Kier,
125 Colo. 333, 243 P. 2d 317. In that case it was held to be error
committed by the trial court in submitting instructions to the jury
concerning liability of the defendant under the "Family Car Doc-
trine" because, as a matter of law, there was no indication that
the automobile involved was kept or maintained for the use and
convenience of the members of the family. The automobile in-
volved was owned by a corporation, and the evidence showed the
auto to be principally used in connection with corporation business.
Judgment for plaintiffs was reversed.
After the decision in Boyd v. Close, supra, the "Family Car
Doctrine" seemed well established in Colorado. That case extended
the doctrine to broad limits when the court said, "That Mrs. Phillips
DICTA
May-June, 1956
did not know of or expressly sanction the particular trip is also
immaterial." In Boyd v. Close there appeared to be no "general
permission" extended to Dennis by Mrs. Phillips, yet the court
found her sanction of the particular trip was unnecessary. The
cases of Boltz v. Bonner, supra, and Greenwood v. Kier, supra, did
not turn on the necessity of a consent to the use of the auto, but
merely on what was or was not a "family car". The subject case
of Vick v. Zumwalt seems definitely to limit the effect of the de-
cision in Boyd v. Close, supra, and to limit the extension of the
doctrine created therein.
As we have seen the court has found that there must be con-
sent, express or implied, to the use of the car by the child. Where
the elements of knowledge and consent had heretofore seemed to
be overlooked, or at least considered not to be necessary to the
decisions by the court, (indeed considered immaterial in Boyd v.
Close) they are found essential to a finding of liability in Vick v.
Zumwalt. Colorado now seems to stand with the states denying
liability where the car is taken surreptitiously and in violation of
instructions.
In summary, a review of the Colorado decisions involving the
"Family Car Doctrine" to this date seems to hinge liability on four
factors, the absence of any one of which would be fatal to the
action:
1. Right to control the use of the car vested in the defendant.
2. Auto maintained by the one with the right to control for
the convenience, pleasure and use of the family.
3. Consent to the general use, either express or implied, or
express consent to use on a particular occasion in the absence of
general consent-such consent issuing from the one with the right
to control, who maintains the auto for family use.
4. Such use on the occasion of an accident must be within the
scope of family purposes for which the auto is maintained.
-By Richard Eason, Student, University of Denver College of Law
Mr. Eason received his B.S. degree in 1950 from the University
of Nevada and is currently a senior at the University of Denver
College of Law. He is a member of the Board of Dicta and a
member of Phi Delta Phi legal fraternity.
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